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Effects of International Institutional Factors on 
Earnings Quality of Banks 
 
Abstract 
 We examine the relation between legal, extra-legal and political institutional 
factors and earnings quality of banks across countries. We predict that earnings 
quality is higher in countries with legal, extra-legal and political systems that reduce 
the consumption of private control benefits by insiders and afford outside investors 
greater protection. Using a sample of banks from 29 countries over the period from 
1993 to 2006, we find all five measures of earnings quality studied are higher in 
countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and political institutional structures. Our 
findings highlight the implications of institutional environments for financial 
reporting quality and are relevant to bank regulators who are considering additional 
regulations on bank financial reporting. 
 
JEL classification: G34; G38; M41 
 
Keywords: International institutional factors, Earnings quality, Bank loan loss 
provisions, Bank loan charge-offs. 
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Effects of International Institutional Factors on 
Earnings Quality of Banks 
 
1. Introduction 
We investigate whether differences in country-wide legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions explain cross-country differences in earnings quality of banks. 
We examine earnings quality from two perspectives: an information perspective and 
an opportunistic earnings management perspective. The information perspective 
indicates that earnings quality increases as managers report less noisy or more 
accurate earnings or take reporting actions that reveal information about banks' future 
earnings and cash flows.  By contrast, earnings quality decreases if managers act 
opportunistically and take actions that disguise the true underlying economic 
performance of the bank in an effort to enhance their own welfare at the expense of 
investors. We examine the implications of differences in international institutional 
factors on earnings persistence, predictability of future cash flows, future loan write-
offs, earnings benchmark-beating behavior, and income-increasing abnormal loan 
loss provisions. 
   Recent research shows that the reporting environment is shaped by country-
specific institutional structures including legal and judicial systems, product-market 
competition, press coverage, tax compliance and political economy (Ball et al. 2000; 
Ball et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004; Gul 2006). Another stream of research 
documents the role of legal, extra-legal and political institutions in reducing the 
consumption of private control benefits by insiders (LaPorta et al. 1998; Dyck and 
Zingales 2004; Haw et al. 2004). The potential for private control benefits provides 
incentive to insiders to distort financial reports, thus decreasing their credibility (Leuz 
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et al. 2003). Strong institutional structures constrain the consumption of private 
control benefits and improve the credibility of financial statements. 
Prior research on the relation between international institutional factors and 
earnings quality excludes firms in banking and financial services (e.g., Ball et al. 
2000; Leuz et al. 2003). Given the importance to national and global economies of 
this highly leveraged sector of the economy, that firms in this sector are very different 
from industrial firms, and the recent concern with the quality of reported earnings 
following the meltdown in this sector, a study of factors affecting earnings quality in 
the banking industry clearly is warranted. In an attempt to better understand 
differences in earnings quality of banks, we provide empirical evidence on the 
relation between several dimensions of earnings quality of banks and cross-country 
differences in legal, extra-legal, and political institutional structures.  
In addition to the important role banks play in the economy of a country; 
studying attributes of earnings quality of banks has several advantages. First, 
measures of abnormal accruals, a commonly used proxy for earnings quality in prior 
research, are subject to serious measurement error (Guay et al. 1996; McNichols 
2000; 2002; Jones et al. 2008). 1   For example, McNichols (2002) questions the 
construct validity of a proxy based on aggregate accruals because of the complexity 
associated with modeling the estimation errors in aggregate accruals.  In their review 
of research on earnings management, Healy and Wahlen (1999) highlight the paucity 
of evidence on earnings management and suggest examination of specific accruals. 
Similarly, McNichols (2002) notes that the potential to develop models of specific 
accruals is largely untapped and recommends focusing on a specific accrual to better 
                                               
1
 Jones et al. (2008) find that the commonly used discretionary accrual measures do not capture many 
instances of extreme earnings management including fraudulent earnings and restatement of financial 
statements. 
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understand the forces shaping management’s accrual choices.  Our study can be 
viewed as a response to the calls by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and McNichols (2002). 
  Second, this study mitigates error in measuring managerial discretion by 
focusing on a single industry. By focusing on a single, mature industry, our study 
avoids the drawbacks of pooling firms at different stages of their life-cycle in a single 
sample. Thus, our results are likely to be attributable more to differences in 
institutional factors than to omitted variables related to differences in industry 
characteristics and/or firms' life-cycles. Focusing on a single, relatively homogeneous 
industry also facilitates control over other determinants of cross-sectional differences 
in properties of earnings and increases the reliability of the inferences from our 
empirical analyses. Furthermore, focusing on a single accrual (loan loss provisions) 
facilitates a better separation into its nondiscretionary and discretionary components, 
thus permitting a more accurate assessment of earnings quality.     
  Finally, banking has been a profitable industry until 2007. It ranked second 
after pharmaceuticals in profitability among Fortune 500 firms in the US in 2001 
(Public Citizen 2002) and third in return on revenues in 2005 (CNNMoney.com).  
These high levels of profitability provide opportunities and incentives for managers to 
earn quasi-rents from distorting earnings. Overall, the above reasons indicate that 
focusing on the banking industry provides an appealing context for examining the 
relation between international institutional factors and earnings quality. 
We hypothesize that banks in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions will exhibit higher earnings quality. We use earnings persistence, 
cash flow predictability, the ability of current period’s loan loss provisions to predict 
next period’s loan charge-offs, the extent of earnings management to just-meet-or-
beat prior year’s earnings, and the extent of income-increasing earnings management 
through abnormal loan loss provisions as measures of earnings quality. We use the 
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rule of law index and the efficiency of the judicial system (LaPorta et al. 1998) and 
the law and order index (Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2005) as 
well as a principal component extracted from these three variables as proxies for the 
legal environment. We proxy for extra-legal institutional structures with competition 
between banks, newspaper circulation and tax compliance (Dyck and Zingales 2004), 
and a principal component derived from these three variables. For political 
involvement of the government in business, we use risk of expropriation, state 
ownership and cost of starting a business (Bushman et al. 2004), and a principal 
component extracted from these three variables.   
We use an international bank sample from the BankScope database 
representing 29 countries for the period between 1993 and 2006 to test our 
hypotheses. Our results indicate that country-wide legal, extra-legal and political 
institutions have strong association with all our measures of earnings quality. In 
particular, we document that international institutional factors greatly increase the 
information value of bank earnings. Earnings persistence, cash flow predictability, 
and the ability of current period’s loan loss provisions to predict next period’s loan 
charge-offs are all enhanced by strong legal, extra-legal and political institutions. 
Furthermore, our results show that international institutional factors constrain 
opportunistic earnings management by managers of banks. We find that higher 
quality legal, extra-legal and political systems reduce earnings management to just-
meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings and reduce income increasing abnormal loan loss 
provisions.    
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our results extend 
prior research on the effects of international institutional factors to the banking 
industry. Our study identifies international institutional characteristics that are 
associated with relatively higher quality of earnings in banks around the world. In 
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particular, we provide evidence on the relations between country-specific institutional 
structures and past practices related to loan write-offs and income-increasing 
managerial discretion in the estimation of loan loss provisions. Second, we employ a 
broader test of earnings quality that spans both the information perspective and 
opportunistic earnings management perspective. Third, our research design mitigates 
error in measuring managerial discretion by focusing on a single industry. By so 
doing, our study confirms the findings of past research focusing on industrial firms 
that has recently come under scrutiny (Watts 2009). 
Because our results may be driven by country-specific bank monitoring 
variables that are correlated with the international institutional factors studied, we 
repeat the analysis after controlling for cross-country differences in bank regulation, 
bank supervision, and level of financial development (Fonseca and Gonzalez 2008).  
Our results are robust to controlling for these additional variables. Furthermore, 
because country-specific accounting rules may also affect a bank manager’s ability to 
manage earnings (Hung 2001; Leuz et al. 2003), we re-estimate our regression 
models after including the accrual index and the degree of a country’s tax-book 
conformity  (Hung 2001) to control for cross-country differences in accounting rules. 
Once again, including these additional controls does not qualitatively alter our main 
results.         
Our study is timely and relevant given the recent banking crisis that has 
placed particular emphasis on earnings quality of banks, especially related to loan 
write-offs and adequacy of loan loss provisions. The recent, massive write-downs in 
the banking industry have led some to argue for increased regulation, while others 
argue that the failure of existing regulation to prevent these events indicates that 
additional regulation is futile (Altamuro and Beatty 2008). By providing evidence that 
enhances our understanding of how institutional features related to legal, extra-legal 
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and political institutions are associated with earnings quality, our results will serve as 
an important input on decisions to enhance the effectiveness of current regulations on 
bank financial reporting. 
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss related research in the next 
section and present the measures of earnings quality used in the study in section three. 
We describe the sample selection and data in section four, discuss the results in 
section five, and provide our conclusions in the final section. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 Earnings quality research in the banking industry has focused on examining 
the ability of accounting earnings to signal future bank performance and on earnings 
management using specific items, such as loan loss provisions (LLP). However, with 
the recent high profile banking crisis, the ability of bank earnings to reflect bank 
performance has been questioned. Also of interest are the underlying incentives for 
earnings management and effectiveness of internal and external control systems in 
reducing earnings management. The extant literature on the use of LLP to manage 
earnings has mainly dealt with detecting earnings management. For example, Wahlen 
(1994) and Collins et al. (1995), among others, find evidence that banks use LLP to 
manage income. However, the possible underlying motives or factors that restrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior that could explain bank earnings management 
remain largely unexplored.2  In this paper, we focus on the effects of international 
institutional factors on earnings quality of banks using a broad set of earning quality 
                                               
2
 Notable exceptions are Beatty et al. (2002), Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) and Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2004). These papers provide evidence that meeting earnings thresholds, job security, reduction of 
earnings variability, and need for external financing are some of the factors explaining cross-sectional 
differences in earnings management through LLP. 
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measures including timely recognition of loan charge-offs and banks’ use of LLP to 
increase income.3   
Recent research on industrial firms shows that strong country-level 
institutions can reduce consumption of private control benefits by insiders (LaPorta et 
al. 1998; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Haw et al. 2004). By reducing private control 
benefits, institutional structures improve the credibility of financial statements. 
Consistent with this line of inquiry, Leuz et al. (2003) report that earnings 
management decreases with the strength of legal environment. Haw et al. (2004) find 
that extra-legal institutions such as competition laws, media pressure and tax 
enforcement constrain earnings management. Bushman et al. (2004) report lower 
transparency for firms in political environments with high risk of expropriation, state 
ownership, and cost of starting a business. Strong institutional structures also 
encourage more timely disclosure and greater transparency (Darrough and Stoughton 
1990; Pagano and Volpin 2001, 2005).4  
 
2.1  Effect of legal variables on earnings quality 
Legal systems protect outsiders by giving them the rights to discipline insiders 
and to enforce contracts. La Porta et al. (1998) report that the extent of legal 
protection of outside investors varies across countries. Outside investors use financial 
reports to monitor the activities of insiders and rely on the legal system to give them 
the power to take appropriate action in times of doubt. Hung (2001) argues that 
managers are more likely to behave opportunistically in an environment with weak 
                                               
3
 As with all accruals, discretionary LLP will also reverse over time. In the short term, opportunistic 
income increasing discretionary LLP will result in under-provision of reserves which will be harmful 
to banks.   
 
4
 To our knowledge, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) and Shen and Chih (2005) are the only two studies 
that examine earnings management in banks in an international setting. Compared to these studies, 
our paper employs both a broader set of institutional factors and earnings quality tests using more 
recent data.   
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shareholder protection and shows that a higher use of accrual accounting negatively 
affects the value relevance of accounting measures for countries with weak 
shareholder protection. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that earnings management is more 
pervasive in countries with weak legal protection of outside investors because 
insiders enjoy more private benefits and have stronger incentives to hide the true firm 
performance. They document that earnings management is negatively related to 
outsider rights and legal enforcement. DeFond et al. (2007) provide evidence that 
annual earnings announcements are more informative in countries with less earnings 
management and that, on average, earnings announcements are more informative in 
countries with strong investor protection institutions. Overall the evidence suggests 
that the legal protection offered to shareholders improves the inherent quality of 
financial statements.  
The first two legal variables we use to measure the characteristics of the legal 
system are from LaPorta et al. (1998): the rule of law index (RULE) and the 
efficiency of the judicial system (EFF). The third variable is the law and order index 
(LAWORDER) from the Economic Freedom of the World annual report (2005). We 
also create a principal component (LEGAL) extracted from RULE, EFF, and 
LAWORDER. Detailed descriptions of these variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
These legal variables capture the features of the legal system and tradition as well as 
the efficiency of enforcement. We expect higher values of these variables to be 
related to higher earnings quality of banks.  
 
2.2  Effect of extra-legal variables on earnings quality 
The extra-legal institutions considered in this study are drawn primarily from 
Dyck and Zingales (2004). These include strength of product competition, per capita 
circulation of daily newspapers, and rate of tax compliance. While an effective legal 
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system impedes opportunistic actions and expropriation devices that are clear and 
detectable, a number of executive actions fall in the “grey” areas that are not clear 
and detectable by law. Rather, they can be constrained more effectively by the 
marketplace and reputation effects. Haw et al. (2004) show how these extra-legal 
institutions, in conjunction with the legal systems, can constrain opportunistic 
earnings management. 
In the banking industry, competition among banks effectively reduces the 
consumption of private benefits because such consumption will make the bank less 
competitive, less profitable, and in turn, less attractive to managers (Haw et al. 
2004). Further, in a competitive market, the market is likely to significantly penalize 
managers involved in any deliberate distortion of earnings. These forces limit 
opportunistic behavior and reduce the opportunity for earnings management by 
banks. 
We also argue that discipline is imposed on managers partly by the fear of 
reputation loss resulting from opportunistic actions in reporting. Higher newspaper 
coverage and a better-educated investor population that reads newspapers affect the 
magnitude of this reputation loss. Free, fair and extensive press diffusion therefore 
leads to more accurate reporting by managers, thus increasing the informativeness of 
earnings.  
Our third proxy for extra-legal institutions is related to tax compliance. Tax 
authorities have the objective of verifying the income produced by the firm (Dyck 
and Zingales 2004), albeit as per tax rules rather than GAAP. However, the 
verification role carried out by tax authorities produces a degree of assurance on the 
unbiasedness of earnings for investors in regimes where tax regulation enforcement 
is strong. Tax law enforcement is measured by the degree of tax compliance.  
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We use competition between banks (COMPBANK), newspaper circulation 
(NEWS), and tax compliance (TAX), and a principal component (ELEG) to proxy for 
extra-legal institutions. Higher values of these variables indicate a stronger extra-
legal environment. Therefore, we expect the extra-legal variables to be positively 
related to earnings quality of banks. 
 
2.3  Effect of political economy variables on earnings quality 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that both the legal system and economic 
outcomes are determined by the political system. Bushman et al. (2004) assert that 
the pressure to protect expropriation and corruption by politicians and their cronies 
could adversely affect the accuracy of reported financial information in state-owned 
enterprises. Furthermore, the government could impose additional cost on entrants to 
shield the economic rents of politically connected firms from competition and in the 
process restrict the flow of information to the public to avoid undesirable scrutiny. 
Additionally, if there is a high potential for direct expropriation by the government, 
more transparent firms face higher risk of expropriation. This is because they would 
be viewed as being noncooperative with corrupt politicians and because the 
transparency allows the government to muster arguments for expropriation of the 
firm’s assets and profits. Using risk of expropriation, cost of starting a business, and 
state ownership as measures of the political economy of a country, Bushman et al. 
(2004) find that these variables are significant in determining corporate financial 
transparency in a country. They define financial transparency as the intensity of 
financial disclosures and their interpretation and dissemination by analysts and the 
media.5 Consistent with Bushman et al. (2004), we measure political involvement of 
                                               
5
 A number of other recent studies also identify country-specific political variables as determinants of 
political development and reporting incentives (LaPorta et al. 1997, 2000, 2002; Rajan and Zingales 
2003). 
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the government in business by the risk of expropriation (RISKEXP), state ownership 
(SOE), and cost of starting a business (STARTBUS). We also use a principal 
component (POLITICAL) to proxy for political variables. We code these political 
system variables such that higher values of these variables indicate lower political 
risks. Higher values of our political variables indicate a higher level of financial 
transparency, resulting in more accurate reporting (i.e., increase in the 
informativeness of earnings) and less opportunistic earnings management. 
Therefore, we expect these variables to be positively associated with earnings 
quality of banks.  
 
3. Measures of Earnings Quality 
Our main prediction is that banks in countries with better legal, extra-legal 
and political environments have higher earnings quality. We employ several 
traditional proxies of earnings quality such as earnings persistence, predictability of 
cash flows and managing earnings to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings, and 
bank specific proxies such as the ability of current period’s loan loss provisions to 
predict next period’s loan charge-offs and earnings management through current 
period’s income increasing abnormal loan loss provisions. Our earnings quality 
proxies closely resemble the measures used by Altamuro and Beatty (2008) who 
examine the effect of FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991)-mandated internal control requirements on earnings quality of US 
banks. Our proxy for abnormal loan loss provisions is based on prior banking 
research on loan loss provisions (Wahlen 1994; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004).   
3.1 Earnings persistence and predictability of cash flows 
 
We examine two related but distinct measures of earnings quality: earnings 
persistence, and the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows. We 
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estimate earnings persistence as the coefficient on current period earnings (defined as 
net income before income taxes) in a regression of future earnings on current 
earnings. We measure earnings’ ability to predict future cash flows as the coefficient 
from a regression of one-period-ahead earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions 
on current period net income before taxes.6 We estimate the following regressions to 
investigate the effect of international institutional factors on these earnings quality 
measures: 
 
EBTt+1 = β0 + β1 EBTt + β2 MEASURE + β3 MEASURE *EBTt + β4 SIZEt   
+ β5 BANK + β6 CR_RIGHT + β7 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> + e  (1) 
 
EBTLLPt+1 = β0 + β1 EBTt + β2 MEASURE + β3 MEASURE *EBTt + β4 SIZEt  
+ β5 BANK + β6 CR_RIGHT + β7 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> + e    (2) 
Where: 
EBTt+1 = earnings before taxes during year t+1 scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the year; 
EBTLLPt+1  = earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions during year t+1 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
MEASURE = one of nine individual international institutional variables or 
one of three principal components that proxy for legal, extra-
legal and political variables; 7 
SIZEt = log of total assets at the beginning of the year; 
BANK = a bank system dummy, which equals 1 for countries whose 
financial system is bank-dominated and 0 for countries whose 
financial system is market-oriented, as per the classification of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999); 
CR_RIGHTS  = an index aggregating different creditor rights as reported in La 
Porta et al. (1998). The index ranges from 0 to 4; and 
DISC_INDEX = a disclosure index as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). The 
index ranges from 0 to 90. 
 
 
                                               
6
 Prior research in banking (Whalen 1994; Altamuro and Beatty 2008, among others) has used 
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions as a proxy for cash flow, since loan loss provisions are 
the single largest accrual for banks. 
 
7
 We mean-center the country level variables to reduce problems with multicollinearity among the 
interaction terms (Neter et al. 1989; Aiken and West 1991).  
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We include the three country specific variables, BANK, CR_RIGHTS and 
DISC_INDEX, as control variables in all our regressions. We do not offer directional 
predictions on the coefficients of these variables. Prior studies (e.g., Kwok and 
Tadesse 2006; Purda 2008) indicate that a firm’s perceived risk (and the associated 
earnings quality due to earnings management) is influenced by whether the financial 
system in the country is bank- or market-based (BANK).8 We control for creditor 
rights (CR_RIGHTS) since Shen and Chih (2005) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) 
suggest that the rights accorded to creditors likely reduce earnings management, as 
stronger creditor rights against borrower expropriation reduce bank risk in lending 
activities and thus their incentives to manage earnings. Lastly, we include level of 
disclosure (DISC_INDEX) as a control variable, since greater transparency in 
accounting disclosure can reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings (Fonseca and 
Gonzalez 2008). 
In models (1) and (2), the coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the 
interaction variable MEASURE*EBTt which is predicted to have a positive sign, 
consistent with the argument that international institutional factors enhance earnings 
persistence and predictability of cash flows in banks. 
  
3.2 Loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs 
 
Beatty and Altamuro (2008) document a weaker relation between the current 
period's loan loss provisions and next period's loan charge-offs for banks with higher 
earnings management. We predict that if international institutional factors strengthen 
the validity of the loan loss provisions, then we should observe a stronger relation 
                                               
8
 Kwok and Tadesse (2006) show that countries characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance are 
more likely to have a bank-based system while Purda (2008) reports that firms located in a country 
with a bank-oriented system are perceived as posing a lower credit risk.  
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between current period loan loss provisions and next period charge-offs. We use the 
following model to test this hypothesis: 
 
CHGOFFt+1 = γ0 + γ1 LLPt + γ2 MEASURE + γ3 MEASURE*LLPt + γ4 SIZEt   
+ γ5 BANK + γ6 CR_RIGHT + γ7 DISC_INDEX  + <Year Controls> + e    (3) 
Where: 
CHGOFFt+1 = loans charged off by the bank during year t+1, scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year; and  
LLPt = provisions for loan losses during year t, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of year t. 
 
And all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
 
 The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction variable 
MEASURE*LLPt which is predicted to have a positive sign, consistent with the 
argument that international institutional factors strengthen the validity of the loan loss 
provisions in predicting next period’s loan charge-offs, i.e., current period loan loss 
provisions better reflect expected  loan charge-offs in the next period. 
 
3.3 Managing earnings to just-meet-or-beat prior year's earnings  
Beatty et al. (2002) and Altamuro and Beatty (2008) report that managers 
have incentive to manage earnings to just-meet-or-beat prior period’s earnings. We 
examine whether international institutional factors dampen this incentive. 9  We 
include all available additional control variables (size, growth, loans, leverage, 
change in cash flow, and loan loss allowance) to be consistent with the above 
literature, and estimate the following logit model:  
SMALL_POS∆t = α0 + α1 MEASURE + α2 SIZEt + α3 GROWTHt + α4 LOANSt  
 + α5 LEVt + α6 ∆CASH_FLOWt + α7 ALLOWt + α8 BANK  
+ α9 CR_RIGHT  + α10 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> + e          (4) 
                                               
9
 A recent survey of managers by Graham et al. (2005) finds that meeting or beating prior period’s 
earnings is one of the most important benchmarks for corporate managers. 
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Where: 
 
SMALL_POS∆t = an indicator variable taking the value one if the bank has a 
change in ROA (income before taxes scaled by total assets) 
from year t-1 to year t in the interval between 0 and 0.001, 
zero otherwise; 
GROWTHt = the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of 
year t; 
LOANSt = total loans scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
LEVt = total equity divided by total assets at beginning of year t; 
∆CASH_FLOWt = change in cash flows (earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions) from the beginning to the end of year t scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of year t; and 
ALLOWt = allowance for loan losses at the end of year t, scaled by 
total assets at beginning of year t. 
 
And all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on MEASURE which is predicted 
to have a negative sign, consistent with the argument that higher quality international 
institutional environments dampen managers’ incentive to manage earnings to just-
meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings. 
 
3.4 Income increasing abnormal loan loss provisions 
 
  We use a two-stage approach to examine the relation between international 
institutional factors and income increasing earnings management.  We first estimate 
the normal or nondiscretionary component of LLP by regressing LLP on beginning 
loan loss allowance, net loan charge-offs, change in total loans outstanding, total 
loans outstanding, loan categories, and controls for period and country effects using 
the following model:10 
LLPit = λ0 + λ1 BEGLLA + λ2 LCO + λ3 CHLOANS + λ4 LOANS  
     + <LOAN CATEGORIES> + <YEAR CONTROLS> + <COUNTRY  
          CONTROLS > + eit            (5) 
                                               
10
 These variables have also been used in several prior studies (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Kanagaretnam et 
al. 2004) to estimate the normal component of LLP.  
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Where (all variables are deflated by beginning total assets): 
LLP = provisions for loan losses; 
BEGLLA = beginning loan loss allowance; 
LCO = net loan charge-offs; 
CHLOANS = change in total loans outstanding; 
LOANS = total loans outstanding; and 
LOAN 
CATEGORIES 
= loans to municipalities / government (MUN), mortgages 
(MORT), hire-purchase / lease (LEASE), other loans 
(OTH), loans to group companies / associates (GRP), loans 
to other corporate (OCORP) and loans to banks (BK). 
  
 
The residuals from model (5) are the abnormal or discretionary component of LLP, 
referred to as ALLP.   
In the second stage, we test the association between international institutional 
factors and the absolute value of negative (income-increasing) ALLP. Negative ALLP 
are of particular interest because of their positive impact on reported earnings.  We 
control for the following factors that prior research has documented are associated 
with abnormal accruals (Ashbaugh et al. 2003): firm size, asset growth, level of past 
accruals, and performance.  We use log of assets to measure size and prior period’s 
LLP to proxy for level of past accruals.  We represent performance by earnings 
before LLP.  Our model is as follows: 
 
ALLP = δ0 + δ1 MEASURE + δ2 SIZE + δ3 GROWTH + δ4 PASTLLP + δ5 EBTLLP  
       + δ6 BANK + δ7 CR_RIGHT + δ8 DISC_INDEX   
       + <YEAR CONTROLS> + ε      (6) 
 
Where: 
ALLP = absolute value of negative abnormal loan loss provisions; 
PASTLLP = prior year’s LLP divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
year; 
EBTLLP = earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions divided by total 
assets at the beginning of the year; 
 
And all other variables are as previously defined. 
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  The coefficient of interest in model (6) is the coefficient on MEASURE. A 
negative coefficient is consistent with our prediction of international institutional 
factors constraining income increasing earnings management. 
 
4. Data Description 
We obtain financial data for the international (non-US) banks for the 
period 1993-2006 from the BankScope database.11 We select sample countries 
from the 48 countries listed in La Porta et al. (1998). We drop 9 countries 
(Ireland, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Indonesia, Jordan, and 
Venezuela) for which La Porta et al. (1998) do not report the accounting 
disclosure index and creditor rights index. We delete another 10 countries 
(Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Uruguay) due to missing bank-specific information (such as loan 
charge offs, loan loss provisions, loan loss allowance, etc).  We retain the 
remaining 29 countries in our study. These include Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom.  
We present the sample distribution by year and by country in Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 1, respectively. The samples for the earnings persistence and 
cash flow predictability tests are relatively larger than the samples for the just-
meet-or-beat, future charge-offs and abnormal loan loss provisions tests because 
of the less stringent data requirements. We present the legal, extra-legal, and 
                                               
11
 As in Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), we omit US banks to avoid potential bias they may be caused 
by the high percentage they represent of the sample (greater than 50% of the sample for the loan 
charge-offs, just-meet-or beat prior year’s earnings, and ALLP tests).  
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political variables and their respective principal components in Panel C of Table 
1. Panel D reports the correlations among the country-level institutional variables. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The residuals from the regression models may be serially and/or cross-
sectionally correlated. We therefore use OLS/logistic regressions with clustered 
robust errors to account for both serial and cross-sectional correlations (Rogers 1993; 
Williams 2000; Petersen 2009). For all tests, we report Wald or t statistics based on 
clustered standard errors after correcting for both serial and cross-sectional 
correlations in the residuals. 12 
 
5.1 Earnings persistence and cash flow predictability tests 
 
We report the descriptive statistics for the earnings persistence and cash flow 
predictability tests in Table 2. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of variables 
used in equations (1) and (2) and Panel B reports the correlations among those 
variables.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 The results for the earnings persistence test are reported in Table 3. In all the 
models, future EBT is positively and significantly associated with current EBT at the 
1% level, consistent with the results reported in prior studies (e.g., Altamuro and 
Beatty 2008). Of primary interest is β3, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
MEASURE*EBTt. A positive β3 indicates higher earnings persistence with stronger 
legal, extra-legal, and political environments. Consistent with our prediction, we find 
                                               
12
 Petersen (2009) suggests that, in the presence of cross-sectional and time-series dependence, one 
dependence effect can be addressed parametrically (e.g., including time dummies for cross-sectional 
dependence) and then standard errors clustered on the other dependence effect (e.g., clustering by 
firms for time-series dependence) can be estimated.  As we have more firm than year observations, we 
use year dummies and cluster by firms because a larger number of clusters leads to standard errors 
that are less biased. 
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that β3 is positive and significant at the 1% level for eleven of the twelve institutional 
variables, indicating strong support for the hypothesis that international institutional 
factors enhance earnings persistence in banks.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Table 4 reports results for the cash flow predictability test. All the models in 
Table 4 show that future cash flow is positively and significantly associated with 
EBT, consistent with the finding in Altamuro and Beatty (2008). More importantly, 
all the institutional variables (with the exception of TAX) show a positive and 
significant coefficient for β3. This evidence is consistent with our prediction that 
international institutional factors enhance the ability of earnings to predict future cash 
flows in banks. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.2 Future charge-offs test 
We report the results of the future charge-offs test in Table 5. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in equation (3) and Panel B 
tabulates the correlations among the variables used in the regression. We report the 
regression results in Panel C. Of interest is γ3, the coefficient on the interaction 
variable MEASURE*LLPt. A positive sign for γ3 is consistent with the argument that 
international institutional factors strengthen the validity of the loan loss provisions in 
predicting next period’s loan charge-offs. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Altamuro and Beatty 2008), the coefficient of LLP is positive and significant at the 
1% level in all models. More importantly, we find that γ3 is positive and significant 
for nine out of the twelve institutional variables. This evidence generally supports our 
prediction that strong legal, extra-legal, and political factors increase the likelihood 
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that current loan loss provisions made by banks will cover loan charge-offs in the 
near future. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.3 Meeting or beating prior year's earnings test 
We report the results of the earnings benchmark test in Table 6. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in equation (4). On average, 13% 
of our sample firms report a small increase in earnings over the prior year. Panel B 
shows the correlations among the variables used in the regression. We report the 
results for the logistic regressions in Panel C. A negative sign for α1, the coefficient of 
interest, suggests that firms are less likely to manage earnings to just-meet-or-beat 
prior year’s earnings when the legal, extra-legal, and political environments are 
stronger. Consistent with our prediction, we find that α1 is negative and significant at 
conventional levels (10% or better) for ten of the twelve institutional variables.  In 
particular, the three principal component factors LEGAL, ELEG and POLITICAL 
have strong negative associations with benchmark-beating behavior. These results 
provide support for the contention that strong legal, extra-legal, and political 
institutions constrain earnings management by banks to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s 
earnings. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.4 Income-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions test 
We report the results for the abnormal loan loss provisions test in Table 7. 
Panel C reports the results of the first-stage regression for estimating abnormal LLP. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al. 2008), BEGLLA is negatively 
associated with LLP since a higher initial loan loss allowance will require a lower 
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LLP in the current period. As expected, LCO and LOANS are positively associated 
with LLP, consistent with the evidence reported in Kanagaretnam et al. (2008). The 
residuals from model (5) represent the abnormal component of LLP. Panels A and B 
of Table 7 present descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients respectively for 
the 7,680 bank-years used in estimating equation (6).   
We are primarily interested in how international institutional factors may 
affect income-increasing earnings management and hence we report in Panel D the 
regression results for the 4,682 bank-years with negative (income-increasing) ALLP 
values. For completeness, we also discuss the untabulated results for the 2,998 bank-
years with positive (income-decrasing) ALLP values. Of interest is δ1, the coefficient 
on MEASURE. A negative sign for δ1 suggests less income-increasing earnings 
management when international institutional factors strengthen. Recall that we are 
using absolute values, so that smaller values of absolute, negative ALLP indicate less 
income-increasing earnings management. Consistent with expectations, the 
coefficient δ1 is negative for ten of the twelve institutional variables (including all 
three principal component factors) that capture different aspects of legal, extra-legal 
and political environments in a country. These results support our contention that 
strong institutional factors constrain income-increasing earnings management by 
banks. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 In untabulated results, we find mixed evidence with respect to income-
decreasing earnings management by banks. Specifically, legal variables (RULE, EFF, 
and LEGAL) are not associated with ALLP, though LAWORDER is weakly and 
negatively associated with ALLP (t=-1.83, p=0.07). On the other hand, we find that 
extra-legal variables (NEWS, TAX, and ELEG) are positively associated with ALLP at 
the 5% level or less. COMPBANK, however, is negatively associated with ALLP (t=-
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4.49, p<0.01). For the set of political variables, RISKEXP, SOE, and POLITICAL are 
negatively and significantly associated with ALLP at the 10% level or less, while 
STARTBUS is not significantly associated with ALLP. Overall, our results for the 
ALLP test suggest that institutional factors are effective in constraining income-
increasing earnings management but not income-decreasing earnings management. 
 
5.5  Sensitivity checks 
We conduct several additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings.  
First, we control for the effects of bank-specific monitoring to ensure that our results 
are not driven by this omitted variable. As suggested by Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2008), bank regulation, bank supervision, and the level of financial development 
may affect the extent of earnings management and hence the earnings quality of 
banks. We use the measure of regulatory restrictions on nontraditional bank activities 
(BANKREG), the official supervisory power index (OFFICAL), and the private 
monitoring index (MONITOR) developed by Barth et al. (2001) to proxy for bank 
regulation,13 and the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP developed by Beck and 
Levine (2002) to measure the level of financial development (FINDEV). Untabulated 
results after including BANKREG, OFFICIAL, MONITOR, and FINDEV in our 
regression models, indicate that our main results are robust to the inclusion of these 
variables. Specifically, we continue to find a strong impact of institutional factors on 
banks’ earnings quality. 
Second, following Leuz et al. (2003), we include contemporaneous per capita 
GDP as an additional control variable in all our regression models because extant 
                                               
13
 BANKREG ranges from 4 to 16; higher values indicate more restrictions on bank activities and non-
financial ownership and control. OFFICAL ranges from 0 to 14; it captures the power of supervisors to 
take prompt corrective action, to restructure and reorganize troubled banks, and to declare a troubled 
bank insolvent. MOINTOR ranges from 0 to 7; it measures the extent of monitoring by outsiders such 
as certified auditors, international rating agencies, etc. Higher values of OFFICIAL and MONITOR 
indicate greater power of supervisors and greater private oversight. 
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research indicates that per capita GDP affects financing, ownership, and payout 
policies across countries. Once again, we do not find any material change in results 
after including per capita GDP in the regression models. 
Third, we use several methods of controlling for the potential effects of 
country-level accounting rules and ownership concentration on our earnings quality 
tests. Accounting rules in a country may limit a manager’s ability to distort reported 
earnings and affect the properties of reported earnings (Hung 2001). Further, 
accounting rules may be correlated with our institutional variables, as they are likely 
to reflect the influence of a country’s institutional environment. To address this 
concern, we control for accounting rules in our regression models. We use the accrual 
index (ACCR) and the degree of a country’s tax-book conformity (TAXBK), both 
constructed by Hung (2001), to proxy for accounting rules. Unreported results 
indicate that the inclusion of either ACCR or TAXBK in the models does not 
qualitatively change our main results. We also employ 2SLS estimation to address the 
potentially endogenous relation between accounting rules and institutional 
environments in affecting earnings quality of banks. Similar to Leuz et al. (2003), we 
use the institutional variables representing legal, extra-legal and political institutions 
(one at a time) as well as three dummy variables for legal origin, indicating English, 
French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins, as instrumental variables. The 2SLS 
analysis indicates that our main results are robust to controlling for the potential 
endogeneity between accounting rules and international institutional structures. 
Prior research also suggests that firms’ ownership structures may affect the 
properties of reported earnings (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2001; Ball et al., 2003). We re-
estimate our regressions using the proxy for ownership concentration (OWNCON) 
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constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) as an additional control variable.14 The inclusion 
of OWNCON in the regression models as well as our 2SLS analysis do not alter our 
main results, suggesting that international institutional factors are strongly related to 
earnings quality of banks after controlling for ownership structure.15  
Our fourth sensitivity test is related to the benchmark beating behavior test. In 
the just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings test, we consider firms meeting or beating 
prior year's earnings when the scaled change in earnings is between 0 and 0.001. As a 
robustness check, following Altamuro and Beatty (2008), we use the more stringent 
bin-width criterion of 0 and 0.0008 in scaled change in earnings instead of 0 to 0.001 
to classify firms as meeting or beating their earnings benchmark. Our results are 
similar to those reported in the main analysis except for the following: the coefficient 
on LAWORDER is negative but insignificant (p=0.12) and the coefficient on 
RISKEXP is positive but insignificant (p=0.20). In our main analysis, the coefficient 
on LAWORDER is significantly negative at the 10% level while the coefficient on 
RISKEXP is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
Fifth, we control for beginning non-performing loans, change in non-
performing loans and tier-one capital ratio in the first stage regression of the 
abnormal loan loss provisions test. Due to additional data requirements, the sample 
size is reduced to 2,415 bank-years, of which 1,410 bank-years have income-
increasing abnormal loan loss provisions. The results for the second stage regression 
indicate that the coefficient estimates for our legal variables (RULE, EFF, 
LAWORDER and LEGAL) are all negative and significant at the 1% level (two-
tailed). We find weaker results for the extra-legal variables. Only COMPBANK is 
                                               
14
 Ownership concentration (OWNCON) is the average percentage of common shares owned by the 
three largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial, private-owned domestic firms in a given 
country. 
 
15
  We note one limitation of this approach - our measure of OWNCON is  based on ownership of non-
financial firms, hence this measure may not be directly applicable to our setting. 
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negative and significant at the 1% level (two-tailed) whereas the other extra-legal 
variables are not significant. We obtain results consistent with the main analysis for 
the set of political variables (RISKEXP, SOE, STARTBUS, and POLTICAL). 
Specifically, the coefficients on the political variables (except STARTBUS) are all 
negative and significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
In the main analysis, we include each institutional variable and each principal 
component for the legal, extra-legal and political variables in the regression analysis 
one at a time. In our sixth sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate all our earnings quality 
tests with all three principal components (LEGAL, ELEG, and POLITICAL) in the 
same regression. In the earnings persistence test, we find that the coefficients on 
LEGAL*EBTt and POLITICAL*EBTt are both positive and significant at the 5% level 
(two-tailed) while the coefficient on ELEG*EBTt is not reliably different from zero. 
In the cash flow predictability test, we find a similar pattern: LEGAL*EBTt and 
POLITICAL*EBTt are both positively and significantly (at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively in a two-tailed test) related to the ability of current earnings before taxes 
to predict next period's cash flow. In the future loan charge-offs test, we find that the 
coefficient on LEGAL*LLPt is positive and significant at the 5% level (two-tailed) but 
not the coefficients on ELEG*LLPt and POLITICAL*LLPt. In the just-meet-or-beat 
prior year’s earnings test, we find that only ELEG is negative and significant at the 
1% level. The coefficients on LEGAL and POLTICAL are both negative but 
insignificant.
  
Finally, in the abnormal loan loss provisions regression, we find a 
negative and significant (at the 1% level in a two-tailed test) coefficient on LEGAL 
and a positive and significant coefficient on ELEG and POLITICAL. Further analysis 
indicates that these results may be sensitive to high levels of multicollinearity as the 
variance inflation factors for these variables exceed 10.  
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We also estimate the abnormal loan loss provisions regression with two 
principal components at a time instead of all three. When LEGAL is combined with 
ELEG or POLTICAL, the coefficient on LEGAL is negative and significant and the 
coefficients on ELEG and POLTICAL are positive and significant. When ELEG and 
POLITICAL are included in the model, the coefficient on POLITICAL is negative and 
significant and the coefficient on ELEG is not significant. 
We also use a single variable which is the first principal component from a 
factor analysis that includes all nine legal, extra-legal and political variables.16  We 
redo all our analyses using this combined factor and our untabulated results show that 
all our five measures of bank earnings quality are significantly associated with this 
variable in the predicted direction. 
Finally, because Japanese banks constitute a large portion of the total sample 
for all our tests, and German banks account for 35% of the samples in the earnings 
persistence and cash flow predictability tests, we examine whether exclusion of these 
countries affects our main results. We find that the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged when we exclude these countries' banks from the analysis. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We study the relations between cross-country legal, extra-legal and political 
institutions and earnings quality of banks across countries. While prior research has 
studied the implications of country-specific institutional factors for financial 
reporting, it has largely excluded firms in banking and financial services. Our study 
attempts to fill that gap.  
                                               
16
 The correlations among the three principal component variables (factors), LEGAL, ELEG and 
POLITICAL, range from 0.69-0.89, indicating high levels of collinearity between these variables 
(please see Panel D of Table 1).  However, the correlations among the nine individual institutional 
variables are relatively much smaller and are only in the range between 0.17- 0.66.  Thus, we compute 
a single factor using all nine variables and this single variable explains 54% of the total variance.   
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We examine earnings quality from two perspectives: an information 
perspective and an opportunistic earnings management perspective. We use three 
measures that reflect the information value of bank financial reporting -- the 
persistence of earnings before taxes, the predictability of current period's earnings 
before taxes for next period's cash flows, and the ability of current period’s loan loss 
provisions to predict next period’s loan charge-offs, and two measures of earnings 
management -- earnings benchmark-beating behavior and income-increasing 
abnormal loan loss provisions. We test whether these earnings quality measures are 
related to characteristics of a country's legal, extra-legal and political institutions. 
Following La Porta et al. (1998), we use the Rule of Law index and efficiency of the 
judicial system as proxies for the country-level legal protection of outside investors. 
We also use the law and order index (LAWORDER) from the Economic Freedom of 
the World annual report (2005) as an additional legal measure.  We use the strength 
of bank competition, per capita circulation of newspapers and rate of tax compliance 
to measure the effectiveness of extra-legal institutions (Dyck and Zingales 2004), and 
the risk of expropriation, state ownership and cost of starting a business to proxy for 
the political economy (Bushman et al. 2004). 
Our sample includes banks from 29 countries and spans the period from 1993 
to 2006. We find a consistent and strong association between factors reflecting 
country-wide legal, extra-legal and political institutions and each of our five measures 
of earnings quality. In particular, we document that international institutional factors 
greatly increase the information value of accounting numbers. Stronger legal, extra-
legal and political institutions are associated with higher levels of earnings 
persistence, cash flow predictability, and ability of current period’s loan loss 
provisions to predict next period’s loan charge-offs. We also find that the 
international institutional factors constrain opportunistic earnings management by 
 28
managers of banks. Higher quality legal, extra-legal and political systems reduce 
earnings management to just-meet-or-beat the previous year’s earnings and reduce 
income increasing abnormal loan loss provisions.  
In a related study, Leuz et al (2003) document that earnings management is 
negatively associated with the quality of minority shareholder rights and legal 
enforcement. Their findings highlight an important link between investor protection 
and the quality of accounting earnings. Our study extends their findings to the 
banking industry. In doing so, we are able to reduce one of the stated main limitations 
of their study, i.e., the errors in measuring the level of earnings management. 
Although our study is to some extent subject to such a limitation, it mitigates the 
errors in measuring earnings management by focusing on a single accrual and a 
single, relatively homogeneous industry. Our study also has a broader scope in that it 
not only focuses on international institutional factors that limit opportunistic 
managerial actions such as meeting or beating past year’s earnings and income 
increasing accrual decisions, but it also examines how international factors enhance 
the information value of accounting numbers. 
 Our study is timely and relevant given the importance of the banking sector in 
a country's economy and the recent banking crisis that has placed particular emphasis 
on earnings quality of banks, especially related to loan charge-offs and adequacy of 
loan loss provisions. The many recent, large write-downs in the banking industry 
have led some to argue for increased regulation, while others argue that the failure of 
existing regulation to prevent these events indicates that additional regulation is futile. 
In particular, our empirical results inform policy-makers on the relationship that 
existed between legal, extra-legal and political institutional structures and the 
earnings quality of banks prior to the current banking crisis. By documenting what 
has worked in the past in different institutional settings around the world, our results 
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are important to regulators as they contemplate additional regulations on bank 
financial reporting.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Legal variables 
 
RULE =  Rule of law index as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). It is 
the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country 
produced by the country risk rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR). Scale from zero to 10, with higher 
scores for greater tradition for law and order.  
EFF = Efficiency of judicial system reported in La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is the assessment of the ‘efficiency and integrity 
of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly 
foreign firms, produced by the country risk rating agency 
Business International Corp. It ‘may be taken to represent 
investors’ assessment of conditions in the country in 
question.’ Scale from zero to 10, with higher scores for 
higher efficiency levels. 
LAWORDER = Law and order from the Economic Freedom of the World: 
2005 Annual Report. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating greater law enforcement. 
LEGAL = Principal component extracted from RULE, EFF and 
LAWORDER. 
   
 
Extra-legal variables 
 
COMPBANK =  Competitiveness of banking industry from the Economic 
Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report. It ranges from 
0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater bank 
competitiveness.  
NEWS = The circulation of daily newspapers divided by population, 
as reported in Dyck and Zingales (2004). 
TAX =  The rate of tax compliance measure from Dyck and 
Zingales (2004). It ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values 
indicating greater tax compliance. 
ELEG = Principal component extracted from COMPBANK, NEWS and 
TAX. 
   
 
Political  variables 
 
RISKEXP = Risk of expropriation by government reported in La Porta 
et al. (1998). Computed according to International 
Country Risk Guide’s assessment of the risk of ‘outright 
confiscation’ or ‘forced nationalization’. It ranges from 0 
to 10, with higher values indicating lower risk of 
expropriation.  
SOE = State ownership from Economic Freedom of the World: 
2005 Annual Report. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating lower state investment. 
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STARTBUS = Cost of starting a business from Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2005 Annual Report. It ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher values indicating lower cost of starting a business in 
a country.  
POLITICAL = Principal component extracted from RISKEXP, SOE and 
STARTBUS. 
 
Following prior literature, we also use the following three variables as country-
specific control variables: 
Country control variables 
 
BANK = Bank oriented system dummy, which equals 1 for 
countries whose financial system is bank-dominated and 0 
for countries whose financial system is market-oriented, as 
per the classification of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1999). 
CR_RIGHT = An index aggregating different creditor rights. Ranges 
from 0 to 4 (La Porta et al. 1998). 
DISC_INDEX = Disclosure index as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). It 
ranges from 0 to 90, with higher values indicating greater 
disclosure requirement. 
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Table 1 
 
Panel A: Distribution of bank-year observations by year 
YEAR 
Earnings Persistence 
 and Cash Flow  
Predictability  
Future Charge 
Offs Just-meet-or-beat Abnormal LLP 
1993 357 71 99 48 
1994 730 120 145 86 
1995 1037 174 213 132 
1996 1385 201 271 158 
1997 1452 198 274 150 
1998 1983 353 400 290 
1999 3235 398 452 347 
2000 4882 1020 1097 517 
2001 4930 1191 1179 1152 
2002 4796 1337 1199 1105 
2003 4628 1402 1202 1063 
2004 4353 1367 1153 960 
2005 4249 1345 1214 889 
2006 2631 854 1160 783 
Total 40648 10031 10058 7680 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of bank-year observations by country 
Country 
Earnings Persistence 
 and Cash Flow  
Predictability  
Future 
Charge 
Offs Just-meet-or-beat Abnormal LLP 
Australia 387 236 338 231 
Austria 1472 14 46 14 
Brazil 1204 683 666 687 
Canada 498 285 69 65 
Chile 220 20 166 19 
Columbia 316 22 154 22 
France 3454 30 338 17 
Germany 14271 53 72 43 
Greece 177 19 108 14 
Hong Kong 688 407 435 375 
India 467 101 208 101 
Israel 132 107 113 96 
Italy 5439 1306 180 10 
Japan 4724 3866 3215 3196 
Korea 284 97 221 100 
Mexico 351 58 152 57 
Netherlands 373 36 63 20 
New Zealand 77 54 68 54 
Norway 470 166 383 166 
Peru 172 30 24 29 
Philippines 321 142 111 137 
Portugal 358 145 277 143 
Singapore 223 71 55 68 
Spain 1348 335 486 330 
Taiwan 471 214 352 231 
Thailand 295 197 114 185 
Turkey 433 122 210 107 
South Africa 382 245 216 241 
United Kingdom 1641 970 1218 922 
 40648 10031 10058 7680 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Institutional variables 
 Legal Variables Extra-Legal Variables Political Variables 
Country RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
Australia 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.23 6.53 3.00 4.58 0.88 9.27 10.00 7.37 1.17 
Austria 10.00 9.50 10.00 1.15 5.73 2.90 3.60 0.30 9.69 4.00 5.42 -0.04 
Brazil 6.32 5.75 3.33 -1.09 7.13 0.40 2.14 -1.14 7.62 8.00 5.73 -0.28 
Canada 10.00 9.25 10.00 1.10 5.08 1.60 3.77 -0.01 9.67 10.00 7.55 1.39 
Chile 7.02 7.25 8.33 0.04 5.95 1.00 4.20 0.08 7.50 10.00 5.65 -0.15 
Colombia 2.08 7.25 1.67 -1.77 5.58 0.50 2.11 -1.19 6.95 2.00 3.75 -1.91 
France 8.98 8.00 8.33 0.48 6.67 2.20 3.86 0.27 9.65 4.00 5.15 -0.15 
Germany 9.23 9.00 8.33 0.68 7.17 3.10 3.41 0.31 9.90 6.00 6.40 0.62 
Greece 6.18 7.00 5.00 -0.65 7.00 - - - 7.12 6.00 4.08 -1.30 
Hong Kong 8.22 10.00 8.33 0.69 7.32 8.00 4.56 2.34 8.29 10.00 9.02 1.43 
India 4.17 8.00 6.67 -0.54 6.35 - - - 7.75 4.00 5.93 -0.57 
Israel 4.82 10.00 8.33 0.16 5.43 2.90 3.69 0.34 8.25 2.00 7.68 0.08 
Italy 8.33 6.75 10.00 0.42 5.70 1.00 1.77 -1.22 9.35 6.00 5.08 -0.09 
Japan 8.98 10.00 8.33 0.81 4.18 5.80 4.41 1.51 8.52 6.00 5.85 -0.10 
Korea 5.35 6.00 6.67 -0.69 3.17 3.90 3.29 0.33 8.31 7.00 5.38 -0.26 
Mexico 5.35 6.00 3.33 -1.20 5.87 1.00 2.46 -0.85 7.29 8.00 3.70 -1.18 
Netherlands 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.23 8.18 3.10 3.40 0.34 9.98 10.00 7.58 1.52 
New Zealand 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.23 7.85 2.20 5.00 0.91 9.69 10.00 7.85 1.51 
Norway 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.23 6.23 5.90 3.96 1.38 9.88 4.00 6.83 0.57 
Peru 2.50 6.75 5.00 -1.27 6.58 0.80 2.66 -0.77 5.54 8.00 3.57 -1.88 
Philippines 2.73 4.75 3.33 -1.82 5.67 0.80 1.83 -1.25 5.22 7.00 5.63 -1.32 
Portugal 8.68 5.50 8.33 0.01 7.27 0.80 2.18 -1.00 8.90 6.00 5.65 -0.04 
Singapore 8.57 10.00 10.00 1.00 4.55 3.20 5.05 1.11 9.30 8.00 8.02 1.22 
South Africa 4.42 6.00 3.33 -1.35 6.78 0.34 2.40 -1.04 6.88 4.00 5.88 -0.91 
Spain 7.80 6.25 6.67 -0.26 6.12 1.00 1.91 -1.13 9.52 4.00 5.67 -0.01 
Taiwan 8.52 6.75 6.67 -0.06 5.57 2.70 3.25 0.05 9.12 2.00 7.58 0.37 
Thailand 6.25 3.25 8.33 -0.74 3.75 0.60 3.41 -0.54 7.42 4.00 7.28 -0.18 
Turkey 5.18 4.00 6.67 -1.04 5.10 1.10 2.07 -1.05 7.00 7.00 5.22 -0.81 
United kingdom 8.57 10.00 10.00 1.00 7.42 3.30 4.67 1.04 9.71 8.00 7.73 1.27 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Correlation between institutional variables 
 RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL NEWS COMPBANK TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
RULE 1.00            
EFF 0.58 1.00           
LAWORDER 0.83 0.67 1.00          
LEGAL 0.91 0.82 0.93 1.00         
NEWS 0.56 0.74 0.59 0.73 1.00        
COMPBANK 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.01 1.00       
TAX 0.57 0.78 0.65 0.74 0.67 0.13 1.00      
ELEG 0.58 0.82 0.62 0.77 0.88 0.14 0.90 1.00     
RISKEXP 0.88 0.61 0.81 0.87 0.61 0.28 0.45 0.53 1.00    
SOE 0.29 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.38 0.28 0.12 1.00   
STARTBUS 0.46 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.50 0.17 0.65 0.66 0.49 0.22 1.00  
POLITICAL 0.80 0.69 0.83 0.88 0.66 0.28 0.64 0.69 0.83 0.36 0.82 1.00 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for  
Earnings Persistence and Cash Flow Predictability Tests 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
EBTt+1 0.0087 0.0063 0.0027 0.0115 0.0920 
EBTLLPt+1 0.0152 0.0107 0.0066 0.0161 0.0907 
EBTt 0.0089 0.0064 0.0027 0.0115 0.0863 
SIZEt 6.8270 6.6139 5.4815 8.0080 1.9513 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 EBTt+1 EBTLLPt+1 EBTt SIZEt 
EBTt+1 1.0000 0.7775 0.7283 -0.0817 
EBTLLPt+1  1.0000 0.6053 -0.1034 
EBTt   1.0000 -0.1086 
SIZEt    1.0000 
 
Definitions of the variables are as follow: EBTt (EBTt+1) is earnings before taxes during 
year t (t+1) scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; EBTLLPt+1 is earnings before 
taxes and before loan loss provisions during year t+1 scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of year; SIZE is the log of total assets at the beginning of year t. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results for the Earnings Persistence Test 
 
For ease of presentation, the coefficient of SIZE, CR_RIGHT and DISC_INDEX has been multiplied by 100. The regression model is: 
 
EBTt+1 = β0 + β1 EBTt + β2 MEASURE + β3 MEASURE *EBTt + β4 SIZEt + β5 BANK + β6 CR_RIGHT + β7 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> + e    
 
The definitions of the institutional variables are provided in the Appendix and the definitions of the firm-level variables are as defined in the footnotes of Table 2. We run the regression clustered by 
firm, and with year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the t statistic in 
parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
 
 
  Legal Variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE Coef. BASIC RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
Intercept β0 0.004 
(1.16) 
0.023 
(5.66)*** 
0.015 
(4.04)*** 
0.018 
(5.15)*** 
0.020 
(4.68)*** 
0.016 
(4.46)*** 
0.006 
(1.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.003 
(0.63) 
0.031 
(7.35)*** 
0.011 
(2.98)*** 
0.016 
(4.36)*** 
0.025 
(5.87)*** 
EBT β1 0.858 
(9.79)*** 
0.493 
(7.44)*** 
0.611 
(15.72)*** 
0.634 
(14.38)*** 
0.555 
(12.48)*** 
0.436 
(7.48)*** 
0.786 
(11.61)*** 
0.859 
(9.99)*** 
0.822 
(11.22)*** 
0.527 
(9.78)*** 
0.502 
(7.81)*** 
0.659 
(14.91)*** 
0.508 
(9.94)*** 
MEASURE β2  -0.001 
(-2.52)** 
-0.002 
(-5.37)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.76)** 
-0.003 
(-2.86)** 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.002 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.002 
(-2.39)** 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
MEASURE*EBT β3  0.152 
(6.54)*** 
0.130 
(7.03)*** 
0.104 
(6.03)*** 
0.294 
(7.96)*** 
0.232 
(8.97)*** 
0.119 
(2.46)** 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.135 
(2.23)** 
0.241 
(6.78)*** 
0.118 
(6.94)*** 
0.168 
(4.49)*** 
0.273 
(7.58)*** 
SIZE β4 -0.016 
(-1.19) 
-0.040 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.039 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.034 
(-2.52)*** 
-0.040 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.040 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.020 
(-1.51) 
-0.011 
(-0.75) 
-0.016 
(-1.10) 
-0.036 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.046 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.037 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.044 
(-3.26)*** 
BANK β5 -0.009 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.007 
(-4.11)*** 
-0.005 
(-4.11)*** 
-0.007 
(-4.72)*** 
-0.007 
(-3.93)*** 
-0.006 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.43)*** 
-0.004 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.010 
(-5.47)*** 
-0.006 
(-5.14)*** 
-0.005 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.007 
(-5.48)*** 
CR_RIGHT β6 -0.041 
(-1.43) 
-0.073 
(-2.07)** 
-0.064 
(-1.73)* 
-0.079 
(-2.23)** 
-0.078 
(-1.83)* 
-0.115 
(-4.13)*** 
-0.054 
(-1.74)* 
-0.031 
(-0.94) 
-0.040 
(-1.26) 
-0.113 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.083 
(-2.28)** 
-0.113 
(-1.95)* 
-0.150 
(-2.39)** 
DISC_INDEX β7 0.003 
(0.53) 
-0.012 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.004 
(-0.82) 
-0.009 
(-2.05)** 
-0.009 
(-1.93)* 
-0.004 
(-0.68) 
0.003 
(0.45) 
0.009 
(1.36) 
0.006 
(0.90) 
-0.024 
(-4.96)*** 
0.003 
(0.54) 
-0.008 
(-2.04)*** 
-0.016 
(-3.66)*** 
Year Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  40648 40648 40648 40648 40648 40648 40004 40004 40004 40648 40648 40648 40648 
Adj R2 (%)  65.02 67.86 67.21 66.97 67.56 67.93 65.89 65.08 65.41 67.41 67.91 66.42 67.60 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for the Cash Flow Predictability Test 
 
For ease of presentation, the coefficient of SIZE, CR_RIGHT and DISC_INDEX has been multiplied by 100. The regression model is: 
 
EBTLLPt+1 = β0 + β1 EBTt + β2 MEASURE + β3 MEASURE *EBTt + β4 SIZEt + β5 BANK + β6 CR_RIGHT + β7 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> + e    
 
The definitions of the institutional variables are provided in the Appendix and the definitions of the firm-level variables are as defined in the footnotes of Table 2. We run the regression clustered by 
firm, and with year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the t statistic in 
parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
 
  Legal Variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE Coef.  BASIC 
MODEL 
RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
Intercept β0 0.004 
.(7.56)*** 
0.050 
(10.78)*** 
0.052 
(11.67)*** 
0.040 
(10.58)*** 
0.045 
(9.59)*** 
0.049 
(12.21)*** 
0.044 
(9.60)*** 
0.038 
(6.60)*** 
0.042 
(7.98)*** 
0.054 
(11.50)*** 
0.043 
(11.07)*** 
0.049 
(11.29)*** 
0.050 
(10.29)*** 
EBT β1 0.894 
(8.63)*** 
0.475 
(7.10)*** 
0.606 
(14.63)*** 
0.630 
(13.66)*** 
0.542 
(12.15)*** 
0.383 
(6.40)*** 
0.816 
(10.29)*** 
0.895 
(8.83)*** 
0.855 
(9.88)*** 
0.514 
(9.42)*** 
0.456 
(7.08)*** 
0.638 
(13.46)*** 
0.468 
(9.14)*** 
MEASURE β2  -0.002 
(-5.11)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.85)*** 
-0.003 
(-6.97)*** 
-0.006 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.48) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.003 
(-4.49)*** 
-0.002 
(-6.18)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
-0.004 
(-3.38)*** 
MEASURE*EBT β3  0.174 
(7.17)*** 
0.151 
(7.52)*** 
0.123 
(6.84)*** 
0.342 
(8.85)*** 
0.282 
(10.30)*** 
0.130 
(2.50)*** 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
0.147 
(2.27)** 
0.276 
(7.34)*** 
0.146 
(8.43)*** 
0.215 
(5.31)*** 
0.333 
(8.93)*** 
SIZE β4 -0.068 
(-4.33)*** 
-0.095 
(-6.65)*** 
-0.097 
(-6.51)*** 
-0.093 
(-6.15)*** 
-0.096 
(-6.52)*** 
-0.101 
(-7.16)*** 
-0.085 
(-5.54)*** 
-0.074 
(-4.45)*** 
-0.080 
(-4.92)*** 
-0.096 
(-6.74)*** 
-0.108 
(-6.69)*** 
-0.095 
(-6.17)*** 
-0.104 
(-6.98)*** 
BANK β5 -0.007 
(-5.70)*** 
-0.010 
(-6.64)*** 
-0.010 
(-8.67)*** 
-0.009 
(-7.60)*** 
-0.009 
(-6.74)*** 
-0.010 
(-8.82)*** 
-0.009 
(-7.94)*** 
-0.008 
(-5.82)*** 
-0.008 
(-7.07)*** 
-0.011 
(-7.15)*** 
-0.023 
(-9.85)*** 
-0.009 
(-9.09)*** 
-0.011 
(-9.80)*** 
CR_RIGHT β6 -0.129 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.144 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.185 
(-5.47)*** 
-0.117 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.129 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.201 
(-7.07)*** 
-0.201 
(-6.15)*** 
-0.148 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.178 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.144 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.158 
(-4.82)*** 
-0.222 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.159 
(-2.97)*** 
DISC_INDEX β7 -0.016 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.025 
(-4.77)*** 
-0.029 
(-5.50)*** 
-0.015 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.019 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.024 
(-4.74)*** 
-0.024 
(-4.08)*** 
-0.020 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.023 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.032 
(-5.95)*** 
-0.016 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.029 
(-5.96)*** 
-0.026 
(-4.70)*** 
Year Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  40648 40648 40648 40648 40648 40648 40004 40004 40004 40648 40648 40648 40648 
Adj R2 (%)  72.85 76.68 75.89 75.64 76.38 77.23 73.92 72.93 73.33 76.06 77.35 75.21 76.76 
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Table 5 
Loan Loss Provisions and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
CHGOFF 0.0032 0.0011 0.0000 0.0039 0.0057 
LLP 0.0054 0.0032 0.0012 0.0066 0.0111 
SIZE 7.6784 7.5194 6.2256 8.9790 2.0638 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 
 CHGOFF LLP SIZE 
CHGOFF 1.00 0.38 0.21 
LLP 1.00 0.10 
SIZE   1.00 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression Results for Future Loan Charge-Offs Test 
 
  Legal Variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE Coef. Basic RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
Intercept γ0 0.011 
(7.38)*** 
0.009 
(5.57)*** 
0.009 
(5.09)*** 
0.006 
(4.15)*** 
0.006 
(3.35)*** 
0.009 
(5.78)*** 
0.010 
(6.59)*** 
0.009 
(5.47)*** 
0.006 
(3.22)*** 
0.010 
(6.42)*** 
0.010 
(6.79)*** 
0.008 
(5.31)*** 
0.006 
(3.65)*** 
LLP γ1 0.111 
(6.17)*** 
0.115 
(6.90)*** 
0.126 
(7.10)*** 
0.112 
(6.39)*** 
0.115 
(6.79)*** 
0.183 
(7.69)*** 
0.111 
(6.23)*** 
0.116 
(5.63)*** 
0.101 
(5.60)*** 
0.137 
(6.93)*** 
0.127 
(7.78)*** 
0.121 
(7.25)*** 
0.107 
(5.92)*** 
MEASURE γ2  -0.041 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.022 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.046 
(-6.42)*** 
-0.125 
(-6.08)*** 
0.006 
(0.60) 
-0.011 
(-2.37)** 
-0.024 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.006 
(-0.77) 
-0.048 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.045 
(-5.83)*** 
0.048 
(3.14)*** 
0.061 
(2.31)** 
MEASURE*LLP γ3  0.028 
(3.67)*** 
0.017 
(3.01)*** 
-0.008 
(-1.07) 
0.042 
(2.40)** 
0.061 
(4.95)*** 
0.012 
(2.17)** 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.026 
(2.10)** 
0.070 
(3.73)*** 
0.026 
(3.99)*** 
-0.019 
(-1.59) 
0.050 
(2.17)** 
SIZE γ4 0.026 
(6.55)*** 
0.027 
(6.86)*** 
0.028 
(6.89)*** 
0.023 
(5.95)*** 
0.028 
(7.03)*** 
0.029 
(7.27)*** 
0.027 
(6.71)*** 
0.028 
(6.93)*** 
0.023 
(5.84)*** 
0.025 
(6.50)*** 
0.026 
(6.57)*** 
0.019 
(5.02)*** 
0.021 
(5.25)*** 
BANK γ5 -0.002 
(-11.51)*** 
-0.002 
(-9.05)*** 
-0.002 
(-9.70)*** 
-0.002 
(-6.85)*** 
-0.002 
(-6.82)*** 
-0.002 
(-7.13)*** 
-0.002 
(-10.65)*** 
-0.002 
(-10.78)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.003 
(-11.31)*** 
-0.003 
(-11.54)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.45)** 
-0.001 
(-1.79)* 
CR_RIGHT γ6 0.022 
(2.19)* 
0.010 
(0.90) 
0.022 
(2.20)** 
0.047 
(4.68)*** 
0.024 
(2.37)** 
0.012 
(1.19) 
0.013 
(1.24) 
0.016 
(1.61) 
0.010 
(0.96) 
0.016 
(1.63) 
0.009 
(0.87) 
0.003 
(0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
DISC_INDEX γ7 -0.015 
(-9.23)*** 
-0.012 
(-6.11)*** 
-0.012 
(-6.20)*** 
-0.008 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.012 
(-7.53)*** 
-0.014 
(-7.87)*** 
-0.012 
(-6.53)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.89)* 
-0.014 
(-8.10)*** 
-0.013 
(-7.83)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.16)** 
Year Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  10031 10031 10031 10031 10031 10031 9911 9911 9911 10031 10031 10031 10031 
Adjusted R-square  12.05 13.09 13.04 13.79 13.29 15.08 12.30 12.07 13.50 13.54 13.73 13.66 14.30 
 
For ease of presentation, the coefficient of SIZE, MEASIRE, CR_RIGHT and DISC_INDEX has been multiplied by 100. The regression model is: 
 
CHGOFFt+1 = γ0 + γ1 LLPt + γ2 MEASURE + γ3 MEASURE*LLPt + γ4 SIZEt  +γ5 BANK + γ6 CR_RIGHT +γ7 DISC_INDEX  + <Year Controls> + e     
 
Definitions for the firm-specific variables are as follow: CHGOFF t+1 is loans charged off by the bank during year t+1, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year; LLPt is the provisions for loan 
losses during year t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; SIZE is the log of total assets at the beginning of year t. The definitions for the institutional variables are provided in the Appendix. 
We run the regression clustered by firm, and with year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For each variable, we report the regression 
coefficient, followed by the t statistic in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Meeting or Beating Prior Year’s Earnings Benchmark Test 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
SMALL_POS∆ 0.1258 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3316 
SIZE 7.9274 7.7977 6.5455 9.1858 2.0034 
GROWTH  0.1165 0.0528 0.0054 0.1523 0.3583 
LOANS 0.6125 0.6073 0.4558 0.7737 0.2821 
LEV 0.0967 0.0672 0.0489 0.1007 0.1026 
∆CASH_FLOW 0.0023 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0037 0.0303 
ALLOW 0.0109 0.0104 0.0054 0.0161 0.0067 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 
 SMALL_POS∆ SIZE GROWTH LOANS LEV ∆CASH_FLOW ALLOW 
SMALL_POS∆ 1.00 0.14 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 -0.08 
SIZE  1.00 0.08 0.12 -0.42 0.05 0.03 
GROWTH    1.00 0.35 0.09 0.27 -0.05 
LOANS    1.00 -0.09 0.10 0.17 
LEV     1.00 0.08 0.00 
∆CASH_FLOW      1.00 0.04 
ALLOW       1.00 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression Results for the Meeting or Beating Prior Year’s Earnings Benchmark Test 
 
 
 
Legal Variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE 
 
Coef. RULE EFF LAWORDER 
 
LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX 
 
ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS 
 
POLICITCAL 
Intercept 
 
α0 
-1.973 
(9.07)*** 
-1.833 
(8.14)*** 
-2.152 
(11.27)*** 
-2.283 
(15.70)*** 
-4.236 
(50.74)*** 
-2.574 
(16.66)*** 
-2.431 
(14.13)*** 
-2.987 
(21.36)*** 
-4.611 
(39.10)*** 
1.140 
(1.94) 
-1.996 
(9.26)*** 
-4.060 
(39.87)*** 
Measure 
 
α1 
-0.072 
(2.98)* 
-0.158 
(27.05)*** 
-0.060 
(2.94)* 
-0.366 
(12.96)*** 
0.049 
(2.20) 
-0.105 
(23.80)*** 
-0.184 
(13.73)*** 
-0.212 
(22.80)*** 
0.125 
(3.47)* 
-0.222 
(38.30)*** 
-0.158 
(7.44)*** 
-0.170 
(4.14)** 
SIZE 
 
α2 
0.134 
(56.21)*** 
0.115 
(40.62)*** 
0.134 
(55.73)*** 
0.129 
(51.97)*** 
0.119 
(44.00)*** 
0.112 
(38.57)*** 
0.121 
(45.27)*** 
0.115 
(40.36)*** 
0.119 
(43.21)*** 
0.117 
(43.95)*** 
0.135 
(57.91)*** 
0.136 
(75.02)*** 
GROWTH 
 
α3 
-0.757 
(22.88)*** 
-0.864 
(26.72)*** 
-0.749 
(23.07)*** 
-0.835 
(26.46)*** 
-0.821 
(25.40)*** 
-0.826 
(24.69)*** 
-0.810 
(24.17)*** 
-0.838 
(25.14)*** 
-0.673 
(18.78)*** 
-0.857 
(27.11)*** 
-0.777 
(24.09)*** 
-0.704 
(21.54)*** 
LOANS 
 
α4 
0.658 
(17.67)*** 
0.608 
(15.79)*** 
0.679 
(18.35)*** 
0.711 
(20.26)*** 
0.446 
(8.79)*** 
0.549 
(12.90)*** 
0.552 
(12.78)*** 
0.548 
(12.74)*** 
0.438 
(8.77)*** 
0.665 
(18.95)*** 
0.685 
(18.92)*** 
0.571 
(16.05)*** 
LEV 
 
 
α5 
-4.393 
(30.63)*** 
-5.039 
(35.38)*** 
-4.377 
(30.27)*** 
-4.786 
(32.92)*** 
-5.217 
(36.96)*** 
-4.721 
(32.79)*** 
-4.896 
(32.19)*** 
-4.880 
(33.07)*** 
-4.323 
(30.37)*** 
-4.947 
(35.72)*** 
-4.119 
(28.68)*** 
-4.097 
(29.84)*** 
∆CASH_FLOW 
 
α6 
-2.301 
(10.94)*** 
-2.502 
(12.36)*** 
-2.198 
(10.20)*** 
-2.351 
(11.32)*** 
-2.348 
(11.50)*** 
-2.475 
(11.55)*** 
-2.383 
(11.17)*** 
-2.460 
(11.55)*** 
-2.267 
(10.54)*** 
-2.415 
(11.95)*** 
-2.273 
(10.67)*** 
-2.300 
(10.02)*** 
ALLOW 
 
α7 
-50.532 
(70.60)*** 
-51.16 
(73.14)*** 
-50.80 
(68.77)*** 
-53.71 
(76.32)*** 
-42.26 
(52.08)*** 
-46.044 
(60.24)*** 
-49.444 
(67.86)*** 
-49.095 
(65.13)*** 
-41.845 
(48.42)*** 
-51.356 
(74.76)*** 
-51.933 
(72.32)*** 
-48.286 
(70.55)*** 
BANK 
 
α8 
0.266 
(7.61)*** 
0.311 
(10.08)*** 
0.247 
(6.64)*** 
0.273 
(7.75)*** 
0.565 
(37.01)*** 
0.444 
(19.38)*** 
0.304 
(9.82)*** 
0.372 
(14.49)*** 
0.402 
(16.15)*** 
-0.775 
(16.25)*** 
0.177 
(2.93)* 
0.315 
(7.92)*** 
CR_RIGHT 
 
α9 
-0.035 
(0.81) 
0.034 
(0.75) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
-0.037 
(1.16) 
0.066 
(2.54) 
0.036 
(0.77) 
0.059 
(2.01) 
-0.046 
(1.67) 
-0.026 
(0.49) 
0.044 
(1.04) 
-0.017 
(0.22) 
DISC_INDEX 
 
α10 
-0.012 
(2.30) 
-0.004 
(0.25) 
-0.011 
(2.03) 
-0.009 
(1.02) 
0.021 
(13.32)*** 
-0.009 
(1.60) 
-0.003 
(0.13) 
-0.005 
(0.45) 
0.009 
(1.20) 
-0.043 
(23.96)*** 
-0.006 
(0.41) 
0.013 
(3.10)* 
Year Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 10058 
Likelihood ratio  371.64*** 379.50*** 372.25*** 372.62*** 348.15*** 357.89*** 350.91*** 358.64*** 360.52*** 376.85*** 375.39*** 417.83*** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
The regression model is: 
 
SMALL_POS∆t = α0 + α1 MEASURE + α2 SIZEt + α3 GROWTHt + α4 LOANSt  + α5 LEVt + α6 ∆CASH_FLOWt + α7 ALLOWt + α8 BANK + α9 CR_RIGHT  + α10 DISC_INDEX + <Year Controls> +e 
 
Definitions for the firm-specific variables are as follow: SMALL_POS∆t is an indicator variable taking the value one if the bank has a change in ROA (income before taxes scaled by total assets) from 
year t-1 to year t in the interval between 0 and 0.001, zero otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets at the beginning of year t; GROWTHt is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of 
year t; LOANSt is total loans scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; LEVt is total equity divided by total assets at beginning of year t; ∆CASH_FLOWt is the change in cash flows (income 
before taxes and before loan loss provisions) from the beginning to the end of year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; and ALLOWt is the tllowance for loan losses at the end of year t, 
scaled by total assets at beginning of year t. The definitions for the institutional variables are provided in the Appendix. We run the logistic regression clustered by firm, and with year dummies. To 
conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the Wald statistic in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Income-increasing Abnormal Loan Loss Provisions Test 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
ALLP 0.0042 0.0027 0.0013 0.0049 0.0049 
SIZE 8.0365 7.9291 6.6894 9.2781 1.9647 
GROWTH 0.1052 0.0372 0.0016 0.1310 0.3920 
PASTLLP 0.0059 0.0033 0.0012 0.0072 0.0123 
EBTLLP 0.0159 0.0091 0.0051 0.0193 0.0255 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 ALLP SIZE GROWTH PASTLLP EBTLLP 
ALLP 1.00 -0.17 -0.04 0.16 0.05 
SIZE  1.00 0.13 0.05 0.07 
GROWTH   1.00 -0.07 0.45 
PASTLLP   1.00 0.16 
EBTLLP     1.00 
 
Panel C: Stage one regression for estimating ALLP 
Variable Coef. Estimate 
Intercept λ0 -0.039 
(-0.26) 
BEGLLA λ1 -0.009 
(-3.75)*** 
LCO λ2 0.022 
(5.65)*** 
CHLOANS λ3 -0.006 
(-6.67)*** 
LOANS λ4 0.010 
(14.91)*** 
MUN λ5 -0.007 
(-1.51) 
MORT λ6 -0.006 
(-8.34)*** 
LEASE λ7 -0.004 
(-2.64)*** 
OTH λ8 -0.001 
(-1.33) 
GRP λ9 -0.019 
(-6.02)*** 
OCORP λ10 -0.037 
(-0.43) 
BK λ11 -0.014 
(-0.24) 
Year Dummies  Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes 
N  7680 
Adjusted R-square  9.52 
  
Table 7 (continued) 
Panel D: Stage two regression for testing the association between income-increasing ALLP and international institutional factors 
 
 Legal Variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE Coef. RULE EFF LAWORDER LEGAL COMPBANK NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE STARTBUS POLITICAL 
Intercept δ0 1.050 
(12.46)*** 
0.984 
(10.75)*** 
0.978 
(12.03)*** 
0.686 
(6.85)*** 
1.139 
 (12.40)*** 
1.019 
 (11.22)*** 
0.983 
 (11.00)*** 
0.987 
 (10.16)*** 
1.248 
(13.82)*** 
1.203 
(12.86)*** 
0.995 
(10.54)*** 
0.896 
(9.12)*** 
MEASURE δ1 -0.030  
(-5.91)*** 
-0.020  
(-3.63)*** 
-0.036  
(-7.70)*** 
-0.084  
(-6.85)*** 
-0.016  
(-2.63)*** 
0.004  
(0.99) 
-0.027  
(-2.68)*** 
-0.005  
(-2.50)** 
-0.054  
(-5.78)*** 
-0.024  
(-5.05)*** 
0.013  
(1.20) 
-0.053  
(-3.75)*** 
SIZE δ2 -0.018  
(-5.84)*** 
-0.020  
(-6.56)*** 
-0.017  
(-5.55)*** 
-0.019  
(-6.13)*** 
-0.019  
(-5.87)*** 
-0.019  
(-5.92)*** 
-0.020  
(-6.26)*** 
-0.019  
(-6.09)*** 
-0.016  
(-4.94)*** 
-0.020  
(-6.49)*** 
-0.019  
(-6.09)*** 
-0.018  
(-5.66)*** 
GROWTH δ3 0.019 (1.19) 0.018 
 (1.13) 
0.019 
 (1.14) 
0.017 (1.11) 0.021 
 (1.24) 
0.020 
 (1.19) 
0.017 
 (1.09) 
0.018 
 (1.14) 
0.022 
 (1.30) 
0.017 
 (1.10) 
0.021 
 (1.23) 
0.019 
 (1.19) 
PASTLLP δ4 -0.816 
(-1.06) 
-0.804 
(-1.07) 
-0.820 
(-1.07) 
-0.928 
(-1.23) 
-0.797 
(-1.04) 
-0.563 
(-0.72) 
-0.551 
(-0.72) 
-0.551 
(-0.71) 
-0.952 
(-1.24) 
-0.899 
(-1.20) 
-0.602 
(-0.78) 
-0.757 
(-0.99) 
EBTLLP δ5 0.037 
(0.09) 
0.041 
(0.09) 
-0.229 
(-0.54) 
-0.152 
(-0.35) 
0.288 
(0.67) 
0.289 
(0.68) 
0.089 
(0.21) 
0.221 
(0.51) 
0.141 
(0.33) 
-0.019 
(-0.04) 
0.237 
(0.56) 
0.130 
(0.30) 
BANK δ6 -0.078 
 (-4.27)*** 
-0.092 
 (-4.84)*** 
-0.070 
 (-4.33)*** 
-0.059 
 (-3.23)*** 
-0.157 
 (-8.68)*** 
-0.143 
 (-7.43)*** 
-0.113 
 (-6.55)*** 
-0.127 
 (-6.84)*** 
-0.095 
 (-5.60)*** 
-0.192 
 (-9.77)*** 
-0.123 
 (-7.26)*** 
-0.141 
 (-8.87)*** 
CR_RIGHT δ7 -0.013 
( -1.70)* 
-0.004 
( -0.49) 
0.013 
(1.68)* 
0.001 
( 0.18) 
-0.006 
( -0.73) 
-0.021 
( -2.31)** 
-0.010 
( -1.10) 
-0.016 
( -1.76)* 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.014 
(-1.74)* 
-0.017 
(-1.81)* 
0.002 
(0.30) 
DISC_INDEX δ9 -0.004 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.003 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.97)** 
-0.007 
(-7.13)*** 
-0.007 
(-5.62)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.006 
(-4.90)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.96)*** 
-0.007 
(-6.40)*** 
-0.008 
(-6.17)*** 
-0.005 
(-4.55)*** 
Year Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  4682 4682 4682 4682 4682 4616 4616 4616 4682 4682 4682 4682 
Adj. R square  13.25 12.22 14.64 13.89 11.80 11.92 12.20 11.88 13.10 12.94 11.60 12.28 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Stage one regression is: 
LLPit = λ0 + λ1 BEGLLA + λ2 LCO + λ3 CHLOANS + λ4 LOANS  + <LOAN CATEGORIES> + <YEAR CONTROLS> + <COUNTRY CONTROLS> + eit      
   
where LLP is the provisions for loan losses; BEGLLA is the beginning loan loss allowance; LCO is net loan charge-offs; CHLOANS is the change in total loans outstanding; LOANS is total loans outstanding. These 
variables are deflated by beginning total assets. LOAN CATEGORIES is an indicator variable for different type of loans. They are defined as: Loans to Municipalities / Government (MUN); Mortgages (MORT), HP / Lease 
(LEASE), Other Loans (OTH), Loans to Group companies / Associates (GRP), Loans to Other Corporate (OCORP), Loans to Banks (BK). 
 
Stage two regression is: 
ALLP = δ0 + δ1 MEASURE + δ2 SIZE + δ3 GROWTH + δ4 PASTLLP + δ5 EBTLLP + δ6 BANK + δ7 CR_RIGHT + δ8 DISC_INDEX  + <YEAR CONTROLS> + ε 
 
where ALLP is the absolute value of negative Abnormal loan loss provisions; SIZE is the log of total assets at the beginning of year t; GROWTH
 
is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t; PASTLLP 
is prior year’s LLP divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; EBP is net income before loan loss provisions divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. The definitions for the institutional variables are 
provided in the Appendix.  
 
We run the regression clustered by firm, and with year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies and country dummies. For each variable, we report the regression 
coefficient, followed by the t statistic in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
  
